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of title thereto, and of unconditional
power of disposition over it, the case is
vastly different." By the negligence of
the pledgor in signing and delivering the
blank bill of sale and power, an innocept purchaser for value is deceived;
hence, the familiar principle comes into
play, sanctioned alike by equity and
common sense, that when one of two
innocent parties must suffer from the
tortious act of a third, he who gave the
aggressor the means of doing the wrong
must alone bear the consequences of the
act: Bank of Kentucky v. Schuylkill
Bank, 1 Pars. Eq. 248. Surely, this is
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no new principle of law: Taylor v.
Girt, 10 Barr 428; M1cMullen v. Wenner,
16 S. & R. ii ; Mote v. Clark, 9 Barr
405.
Are pledgors, then, to be at the
mercy of pledgees? By no means.
Their check upon an unauth6rized disposition of their stock by the pledgee is
to make the certificate "pledged" or
"collateral," stating, if necessary, the
amount for which it is pawned. Thus,
any subsequent purchaser would readily
become affected with notice, and much
difficulty be thereby avoided.
Fnxscs A. Lrwis, Jr.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENT.
Impeachment of-Proof'Necessar.-To impeach the certificate of
the acknowledgment of a deed, the proof must show a conspiracy
between the officer taking the acknowledgment and the grantee, or that
the officer practiced imposition or fraud upon the grantor, and the testimony of the grantor alone is not sufficient to overcome the certificate

and the officer's testimony in support of the same: Fitzgeraldv. Fitz-

gerald,100 Ill.
-Preparedexpressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions
filed during Oct. Term 1881. The cases will probably appear in 14 or 15 ,Otto.
2 From lion. N. L..Freeman, Reporter ; to appear in 100 Illinois Reports.
s From 3. W. Spafilding, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 72 Maine Report..
4 From 3. Shdaff Stckett, Esq., Reporter ; to appear in 54 and 55 Md. Reports.
5 From T. k. Skinker, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 73 Missouri Reports.
6 From Hon. John H. Stewart, Reporter; to appear in 34 N. J. Eq. Reports.
7 From Hon. Benjamin J. Lea, Reporter; the cases will probably appear in 5
or 6 Lea.
8 From Edwin F. Palmer, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 53 Vermont Reports.
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Officer de facto -The

sufficiency of the acknowledgment of a deed

was questioned on the ground that the deputy clerk who took the
acknowledgment had n'ot been legally appointed. The law required
deputy clerks to take an oath for the faithful discharge of the duties of
their offices. It appeared that in this instance the deputy was only
verbally appointed as such, that he was never sworn into office, nor executed any bond as deputy, but that he was acting as such deputy. and
had taken other acknowledgments in the same manner. It was held,
the deputy was at least an officer de facto, and his act in taking the
acknoi~ledgment was valid: Shaip v. Thompson, 100 Ill.
ACTION.

See Husband and Wife.
AGENT.

Notice-Knowledge of Agent before Employnment.-A notice to a
bank director or trustee, or knowledge obtained by him while not engaged either officially or as an agent or attorney in the business of the
bank, is inoperative as a notice to the bank: Fairfield Savings BanAk
v. Chase, 72 Me.
Knowledge of an agent obtained prior to his employment as agent,
and which he has no personal ifiterest to conceal, will be an implied or
imputed notice to the principal, when the knowledge is so fully in mind
that it could not at the time have been forgotten, and relates to a matter
so material to the transaction as to make it the agent's duty to communicate the fact to hit. principal. In such case, the presumption that
an agent will do what it is his duty to do, having no personal motive or
interest to do the contrary, is so strong that the law does not allow it
to be denied: Id.
ASSUINIPSIT.
See Sale.
ATTACHMiENT.

See Fraud

Garnishee- (&nnot contest Judgment.-A garnishee cannot contest
the validity of the judgment, on which the garnishment is based,
because of the failure to comply with all the provisions of the code in
relation to judgments by confession': Cowan v. Lowry, 5 or 6 Lea.
ATTORNEY.
Retainer .Fee- Usage.-The proper scope and application of the right
to charge retainers, is to remunerate counsel for being deprived, by
being retained by one party, of the opportunity of rendering services
for and receiving pay from the other: .XcLellan v. Hay/ford, 72 Me.
There is no such general usage or custom among lawyers in Maine,
to charge retainers in all contested cases in which they are employed,
as to justify an instruction to the jury, as a matter of law, that in contested cases and for reasonable amounts such fees were a legal charge
in each case in which he was engaged. And such an instruction, in an
action by an attorney at law, for services and disbursements in behalf
of'a client, is erroneous, when the account sued embraces, besides the
charges of retainers in each contested case, other charges covering all
the services actually performed, and disbursements made in behalf of
his-client: Id.
BANK.
Account by Depositor as Agent-Deposit of Trust Moneys therein-
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Not subject to Lien for Debt due Bank.-Whcn a bank' account is
opened in the name of a depositor, as general agent, and it is known
to the bank that he is the agent of an insurance company; that conducting its agency is his chief business; that the account was opened
to facilitate that business, and used as a means of accumulating the
premiums on policies collected by him for it, and of making payment
to it by checks; th6 bank is chargeable with notice of the equitable
rights of the company, although the depositor deposited other moneys
in the same account, and drew checks upon it for his private use. And
the insurance company may enforce, by bill in equity, its beneficial
ownership therein against the bank claiming a lien upon the balance
thereof for a debt due to it from the depositor, contracted for his
individual use: Central National Bank of Baltimore v. Conn. Xutual
Life Ins. Co., S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1881.
A banker's lien ordinarily attaches in favor ofthe bank, upon the
securities and moneys of the customer, deposited in the usual course
of business for advances which are supposed to be made upon their
credit, not only against the depositor, but against the unknown equities
of all others in interest. But it cannot be permitted to prevail against
the equity of the beneficial owner, of which the bank has notice, either
actual or constructive : 1d.
BILLS AND NOTES.

See Evidence.

Promissory Note-LiAbility of ;Signers among themselves-One who
signs a note after it has been delivered, and after the consideration has
passed between the original parties, incurs no liability thereon: McJ.1ahan v. Geiger, 73 MIo.
One who signs a note after others, and without any knowledge or
explanation as to the character in which they have signed, may assume
that they are joint-makers, and he will become liable either as surety or
guarantor for all of them; but whether as surety or guarantor is not
decided. As against him it cannot. afterward be shown that one of the
original signers was a surety, for the purpose of charging him as a
co-surety : Id.
Blank Egidorsemet- Construction-Evidence.-The contract entered
into by a blank endorsement of a promissory note will receive such a construction as will give effect to the intention of the parties, and parol
evidence will be admitted to show and explain what liabilities were intended to be assumed at the time of the transaction: Owings v. Baker,
54 Md.
A third party who places his name on the back of a note before it is
endorsed by the, payee, may avoid the liability of a joint promissor
which the law, in the absence of proof to the contrary, attaches to such an
endorsement, by proving a different understanding of all the parties at
the time of the transaction. But an agreement to such effect between
the drawer and a blank endorser alone, without the assent of the payee,
will not suffice : Id.
BROKER.

Duties- Compensation -A broker is entitled to compensation when
he has found for his employer one who makea written contract for
the purchase or sale of the property to be bought or sold: Veazic v.
Me.
Parker, 72
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It is no part of the broker's duty to direct or advise as to the terms
of the contract between the parties, or explain the meaning of the
words used by them: 1d.
Conversations between buyer and seller before and after the making
of the contract are not admissible to iffect the broker's right to compensation : Id.
CHARnTY.
School of Learning-ForeignClharity.-A gift of a fund to establish
and maintain, a school of learning is a charitable trust : Taylor's .Exr's
v. Trustees of Bryn .ffawr College, 34 N. J. Eq.
This court will not administer a foreign charity; but, where such a
charity is valid by the laws of this state, and by the laws of the state
where it is to be executed, and the trustees have the legal capacity to
receive the fund and carry out the charity, this court will order its payment to them : Id.
COMMON CARRIER.
Railroad-Extent of Liability-Deposit in Warehouse.-The duty
of a railroad company is to convey freight to the place directed, and to
deliver it to the party entitled, if there ready to receive it, and, if not,
to store it for him. The liability of the company, as a common carrier,
ceases when the freight is deposited in a warehouse, and is not extended by the Act of 1870, c. 17, Code, sect. 1993, j., requiring the
company to give prescribed* notice to the consignee : Butler v. Railroad Co., 5 or 6 Lea.
CONFLICT OF LAwS.
Law of Sister State-Evidence.-The law of a sister state is a question of fact, to be proved, like any other fact, by appropriate evidence.
In the absence of such evidence, it will be presumed that the common
law is-in force: -Meger v. McCabe, 73 Mo.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw.

See Taxation.

CONTRACT.
Substituton-Novat,:on.-A owed B, and C owed A : by agreement
of the three, C gave his note to B, and was substituted in place of A as
B's debtor. C was insolveht at the time, but this fact was unknown to
'all the parties. Hfeld, that the loss fell on B : Cadens v. Teasdale,

53 Vt.
CORPORATION.
Insolvency-Assets- Trust Fund.-The assets of an insolvent corporation are not turned into a trust fund for the benefit of creditors by
the mere knowledge of its officers of its insolvency, but only by some
positive acts of insolvency, such as the making of a genoral assignment, the filing of a bill to administer its assets, or the permanent
cessation of business; and it is only what remains due from a customer,
after the settlement of mutual debts, that would constitute the trust
fund: Comfort v. Mc Teer, 5 or 6 Lea.
Where, therefore, after knowledge of its insolvency, but two days
before it ceased to transact business, the officers of a bank entered a
credit on the account of one of its customers, which was justified by
the dealings between the parties, it was held that the assignee of the
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bank, under a general assignment for the benefit of creditors, subsequently made, was bound by the transaction : Id.
CRIMINAL LAW.
ignorance of the Law no Excuse-Larceny.-Seet. 1315 Rev. Stats.
1879, makes it larceny for the finder of lost property to make way with,
or secrete the property with intent to convert it to his own use, with intent to defraud the owner. In an indictment founded on this section :
.Hebl, that evidence offered by the defendant to show that it was a general belief among the colored people that property found, having no
marks upon it to indicate its ownership, belonged to the finder, was
properly excluded. Ignorance of the law is no excuse for its violation:
State v. Welch, 73 Mo.
DA51.

See Waters and Watercourses.

DEBTOR AND

CREDITOR.

See Injunction.

Cornposition-Bona Fide Purchaser-Estoppel.-Ifcreditors enter
into a composition agreement with their debtor and sign a receipt for
the agreed amount, and a third party relying upon this, in good faith
advances money to the debtor to enable him to settle with his- creditors,
and in consideration of the advances, receives a transfer of property
from the debtor, the transfer will be valid as against the creditors,
though they are in fact never paid. This is not upon the principle of
estoppel, but because the transferee is a bona fide purchaser: Kuhn v.
Well, 73 Mo.
Trust Assigtnrent-Acceptancee-Attack.ing Creditor.-The acceptance by the trustee of a general assignment for the benefit of creditors.
before the filing of a bill attacking the validity of the assignment, would
enure to the benefit of such of the secured creditors as might, within
a reasonable time, come in under the assignment, and give theii a prior
right to the attacking creditor, whose bill was filed in advance of their
formal acceptance: Nailer v. Young, 5 or 6 Lea.
The presuniption of the acceptance by the beneficiaries of a trust
assignment in their favor, which the law implies when the conveyance
is made with the formalities necessary to pass the title to the property,
or perfect the trust, would perhaps be equally effective, and certainly
if supplemented by actual acceptance within a reasonable time: Id.
DEED.
Inconsistent Descriptions-Construction.-Itis a rule ofr construction
that where there is a doubt as to the construction of a deed, it shall be
taken most favorably for the grantee. If there are two descriptions in
a deed of the land conveyed, and they do not coincide, the grantee is at
liberty to elect that which is most favorable to him : Shaip v. Thompsolt, 100 Ill.
ELECTION.
Irregularitiesin Conducting, not Fatal.-Mere irregularities in conducting an election and counting the votes, not proceeding from any
wrongful intent, which deprive no legal voter of his vote and do not
change the result, will not vitiate the election so as to justify the rejec-
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tion of the entire poll of the town or precinct in which the irregulari-"
ties occurred : Hodge v. Linn, 100 Ill.
EQUITY.
Bills of Review- When Performance of Decree not Essential.-As to
bills of review, which relate to errors on the face of the decree alone,
and which therefore may be filed without leave, the rule requiring
previous performance of the decree, does not apply. Whether the
courts will enter upon an inquiry as to the errors, without requiring
performance of the decree, depends upon the exercise of a sound judicial
discretion applied to the facts of the particular case: Davis v. Speiden,
S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1881.
Pleading-Presumption.of 1Paljment-Demurrer.-A presumption
of payment of a mortgage from lapse of time may be raised by a
demurrer, and such a demurrer does not admit the allegations of a
bill that both the principal and interest of the mortgage are now due
and owing, because such allegations are rather conclusions than averments of. ficts: Olden v. Hubbard,34 N. J. Eq.
Any existing circumstances which would repel such presumption
must be averred in the bill : I'd.
Insufficient Pleas-ailure to file Replication -Pleas
in equity
must allege matters of fact and not mere conclusions of law, and if not
traversable for that reason, or if they have been filed irregularly, for lack
of the affidavit of the party and certificate of counsel required by the
31st equity rule, they may be disregarded: Central Nat. Bank v. Co.nn.
Mut. 1.f e Ins. Co., S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1881.
When an equity cause has been heard upon the merits upon bill,
answer and proofs taken, as upon issue perfected, the want of a formal
replication cannot be assigned as error upon appeal : Id.
Pleading-CrossBill.-A
cross bill is a mode of defence or an
auxiliary suit, and constitutes one cause with the original bill, and a
cross bill will not, therefbre, lie where there is no connection between
the demands or the parties : Comfort v. .MeTeer, 5 or 6 Lea.
ERRORS AND APPEALS.

See E q uity.

Admiralty- Omission of finding of Facts- Certiorari to certify
findings.-To justify the Supreme Court in returning an admiralty
cause, for the purpose of having findings of fact stated and put into
the record, it must clearly appear that the omission of such findings
was attributable to the fault or neglect of the court and not to the
parties: Winslbw v. Wilcox, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1881.
Appeal from Circuit Court-Acts of Congress of 1802 and 1872.Under sect 693, Revised Statutes, final judgments of the circuit courts
in civil actions wherein there has been a division of opinion of the
judges are only reviewable on writ of error or appeal. The Act of
1802 (2 stat. 159, c. 31, sect. 6), which allowed the questions to be'
certified up before judgment was suspended by the Act of July 1st
1872 (17 stat. 196, c. 255, sect. 1): Banking Rouse v. Trustees of
Schools, S. 0 U. "S., Oct. Term 1881.
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See Mortgage; Sale.

EVIDENCE.

Written Contract-Endorsement of .ote-Oannot be varied by
.Parol.-The contract created by the endorsement and delivery of a
negotiable note is not an implied contract, but an express contract,
some of the terms of hich, according to the custom of merchants and
for the convenience of commerce, are omitted.
All its terms are certain and well understood. It is therefore subject to the rule which
excludes parol proof to alter or vary the terms of an express written
agreement: ilartin v. Cole, S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1881.
Susquehanna Bridge Co v. Evans, 4 Wash. 0. 0. Rep. 480, and Ross
v. Espy, 66 Penna. St. 483, dissented from, and Davis v. Brown, 94
U. S. 423, distinguished: Id.
FOREIGN LAW.

See Co2ifict of Laws.
FRAUD.

Attachment---WIat constitutes fraudulent "disposition" of Property.
-Sect. 398 Rev. Stats. 1879, authorizes attachment to issue in the following, among other cases : (7) Where the defendant has fraudulently
conveyed or assigned his property so as to hinder or delay his creditors.
(8) Where the defendant has fraudulently concealed, rtmoved or disposed of his property or effects so as to hinder, &c. Held, that the word
disposed, as here used, covers all such alienations of property as may be
made in ways not otherwise pointed out in the statute-for example,
pledges, gifts, pawns, bailments and other transfers and alienations which
may be effected by mere delivery and without the use of any writing,
assignment or conveyance. It does not include any species of conveyance. Hence, a charge that defendant has fraudulently disposed of his
property is not supported by proof that he has executed a fraudulent
mortgage: Bullene v. Smith, 73 Mo.
GUARANTY.

When Notice of Acceptance not necessary-t Waiver of Notice of default
of Debtor-Rule as to Construction.-The rule requiring notice of the
acceptance of a guaranty, and of an intention to act under it, applies
only where the instrument is merely an offer, and not where it is made
at the request of the creditor, or is for a valuable consideration, or is,
in form, a bilateral contract: Davis v. Wells, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1881.
Where the guaranty is expressed to be in consideration of one dollar
paid to the guarantor by the guarantee, the receipt whereof is therein
acknowledged, it is binding without notice of acceptance : Id.
Where a guaranty declares that the guarantor thereby guarantees
unto the guarantee unconditionally at all times any advances, &c., to a
third person, notice of demand of payment and the default of the debtor
is waived, as well as notice of the amount of the advances when made: Id.
But a failure or delay in giving such notice, if required, is no defence
to an action onothe guaranty unless loss or damage has thereby accrued,
and then only for the amount of such damage : Id.
Notwithstanding the contract of guaranty is the obligation of a surety,
it is to be construed as a mercantile instrument in furtherance of its
spirit, and liberally, to promote the use and convenience of commercial
intercourse : 1d.
VoL. XXX,-10

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
HIGHWAY. See Sheriff.
When, defective-Notice.-M ere slipperiness of a highway or sidewalk, caused by either ice or snow, is not a defect for which towns and
cities are liable: Smith v. Bangor, 72 Me.
The actual notice to some one of the municipal officers, required by
statute, must be a notice of the identical defect which caused the injury.
Notice of another defect, or of the existence of a cause likely to produce
the defect, is not sufficient : Id.
Notice of a defect in a way cannot be proved by the admission of a
town or city officer, though the declarations of such an officer, which
accompanies his official acts and tend to explain tbem, are admissible: Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

Jlfarried Women-Divore.-A woman who is divorced can maintain
an action against her former husband for personal service performed for
him before their marriage: Carlton v. Carlton, 72 Me.
Wife's Separate Eisiate-ortgagefor Husband's Deb.-A married
woman may, with her husband, mortgage her own lands to secure the
payment of his debts cr those of any other person, for the payment of
which she is irm
no way liable: Aferchant v. Thompson, 34 N. J. Eq.
Jointure-Account between Husband's Representative and Widow.A covenant contained in a deed of jointure provided that the husband
should invest his wife's separate estate, and account to her for the income and for the rents of her real estate. After the marriage he
received all of her personal property and invested it, but never accounted
for nor paid to her the income thereof, nor the rents of her real estate,
which he also received. .Hfeld, fhat his repjresentative was, after his
decease, liable to account to her therefor, with interest, to be calculated
with yearly 'rests: Middauqh v. Trimmer, 34 N. J. Eq.
ICE.

See Waters and Watercourses.
INJUNCTION.

Judgment Creditor-Levy on Land in hands of Crantee.-An aliegation in a bill that the defendant, by virtue of a judgment and execution at law against complainant's grantor, has seized upon and is about
to sell lands to which complainant has the legal title, presents no equi.
table ground for enjoining such sale: Sheldon v. Stokes, 34 N. J. Eq.
INSURANCE.

Forfeiture for non-payment of Premium-lfBquity will not relieve
against.-The facts that a policy was taken out by the assured without
the knowledge of his wife, in whose favor it was made payable; that
from a period prior to the falling due of the premium down to the date
of his death, he was, in consequence of illness, deranged in mind, and
incapable of attending to business, and for that reason, alone the premium was not paid, furnish no ground upon which a court of equity can
relieve against the forfeiture: Klein v. ew 'ork Life Ins. Co., S. 0.
U. S., Oct. Term 1881.
In a contract of life insurance, the company take the risk of having
to pay, even though the assured die the day after taking out the policy,
and the assured takes the risk of having to pay premiums during his
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entire life, even though they amount to more than the policy. The
assured also takes the risk of forfeiture for non-payment of any pre-P
mium when due. Neither party has any claim to be relieved in equity
from loss consequent on these risks: Id.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.

See Waters and Watercourses.

LImITATIONS, STATUTE OF.
Joint Note-Payment by one Party.-In an action on a joint and several promissory note against one of two makers, to which he pleaded
payment and limitations, evidence was admissible of payment of items
of interest and of part of the principal by the co-maker, who was dead
when the suit was brought, endorsed on the note in his ha.ndwriting,
and of admissions by the maker sued, to take the note out of the oper-.
aion of the Statute of Limitations, and show that it was the. latter's.
debt: Burgoon. v. BiXler, 54 Md.
MORTGAGE.

See Husband and Wife.

Payment by Third Party on account of First 11ortgage-Subrogation.-After a second mortgagehad been taken on certain lands, a payment of part of the principal of the first mortgage was made by a
brother of the mortgagor, under an agreement between the holder of
the mortgage and the mortgagor and his brother, that the latter should
be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee under the mortgage for
,those payments. Held, that, as against the holder of the second mortgage, such conventional subrogation could be enforced. The payments
were, in fact, made after- the second mortgage was given : Shreve v.
Hankinson, 34 N. J. Eq.
Lien in favor of Mortgageefor Taxes paid by ldm.-Subrogaton.Where it is the duty of a mortgagor to pay the taxes upon the mbrtgaged premises, and upon his failure to do so they are paid by the
mortgagee, the latter will be subrogated to the rights of the state,
which has a lien upon the land for the taxes, and upon foreclosure of
the mortgage it will be proper to decree a lien upon the premises in
favor of the mortgagee for the taxes so paid by him : Sharp.v. Thornyson, 100 Ill.
Parol Evidence to reform Writing-Errorof Fact-Bill to reform
( Mortgage.-In a proceeding in equity to reform a mortgage, parol
evidence is admissible to pro-ve the real contract: Tabor v. ailley,
53 Vt.
Courts of equity will not refuse redress if it is certain that the
written contract conveys a different right, or, effectuates a different
purpose from that intended by the parties ; and will treat the mistake
as one of fact: Id.
But courts of equity will. not reform and enlarge a mortgage executed
by one who is insolvent if the rights of third parties would be changed
and injured thereby. In this case, if the mortgage had been larger
when it was given, the other creditors would have instituted proceedings in insolvency before the orator's lien became absolute: Id.
Purclhase by Mortgagee at his owan Sale.-A purchase by a mortgagee
at his own sale under a chattel mortgage will not be set aside and a
redemption allowed, where the sale and purchase were made with the
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consent of the mortgagor, and under an understanding with him : Goodell
.v.Dewey, 100 IlH.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.

See Hiqhway.

NATIONAL BANK.
Voluntary id'uidatz'on-Liabilily to subseguent Suit by CreditorConcur'rentBill to enjfrce Stockholder's Liability.-A national bank
in voluntary liquidati6n, under sect. 5220 of the Revised Statutes, is
not thereby dissolved as a corporation, but may sue and be sued by
name for the purpose of winding up its business, and it is no defnce
to a suit by a creditor upon a disputed claim that the creditor has also
filed a creditor's bill, under sect. 2 of the Act of June 30th 1876,
authorizing the appointment of receivers of national banks, and for
other purposes, to onforce the individual liability of its shareholders:
Central National Bank v. Conn. .llutual Lif/e Ins. Co., S. C. U. S.,
Oct. Term 1881.
NEGLIGENCE.
Custom Offcers-Liability of Whaif Owners to-Due Care-Contributo / .iegliene.-The owners of a wharf where foreign laden
vessels discharge, are liable to custom officers, who are required to visit
the premises in the performance of their duties, for personal injuries
received while in the exercise of due care, because of the unsafe or
unsuitable condition of the wharf: Low v. Grand Trunk Railway Co.,
72 3He.
A customs officer whose duty is to watch for smugglers and prevent
smuggling, may be in the exercise of due care, when in the course of
his duty he passes over a wharf, where a fbreign laden vessel is lying,
in the night-time and without a lantern: Ard.
Where duty requires one to be concealed, as when watching for
smugglers and evil-doers in the night-time, the fiact that he does not
carry a light is not contributory negligence in an action for damages
sustained by the 'negligence of one whose business imposed the duty
upon the pliintiff: Id.
Aaster and Servant-Independent Contractor.-The obligations existing between master and servant do n6t exist between employer and
contractor. An employer is not liable to others for injuries resulting
from the negligence of a contractor, although the employer may have
known that the contractor was of bad character : .Dobson v. Iron ( o., 5
or 6 Lea.
Whether a person in the performance of work for another is a servant or contractor depends upon whether he represents the will of the
principal in the management and details of the work : Id.
iaoster and Servant-SuperiorServant. Where a section hand on
a railroad, in consequence of the negligence of the section boss in running a "crank car" backwards, falls from the car and is injured, he
may maintain an action against the company: Railroad Co. v. _relson,
5 or 6 Lea.
NOTICE. See Agent.
NUISANCE.
OF.FICER.

See Sheriff.

See Acknowledgment.
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PARTNERSHIP.

Liability for Torts of Co-partner in the Business.-A partner has
authority by reason of the partnership relation, and without the express
assent of his co-partners, to sue in the name of all the co-partners for
the recovery of a partnership debt; and if the suit be by attachment,.
and goods of a stranger are wrongfully seized by order of one, all the
co-partners will be liable : Kuhn v. Weil, 73 Mo.
Real Estate- When treated as Personal Property-Right of Surviving Partnerto sell-Equitable Title of Purchaser.-Real estate purchased with partnership funds for partnership purposes, though the
title be taken in the individual name of one or both partners, is, in
equity, treated as personal property so far as is necessary to pay the
debts of the partnership and to adjust the equities of the co-partners:
Shnk-s v. Klein, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1881.
For this purpose, in case of the death of one of the partners, the survivor can sell real estate so situated ; and, though he cannot convey the

legal title which passed to the heir or devisee or the deceased partner,
his sale invests the purchaser with the equitable ownership of the real
estate and the right to compel a conveyance of the title from the heir
or devisee in a court of equity : Id.
PATENT.

Extent of.-The scope of letters patent should be limited to the invention covered by the claim ; and, though the claim may be illustrated,
it cannot be enlarged by the language used in other parts of the specification: Lehigh Vallq Railroad Co. v. Mellon, S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term
1881.
PLEADING. See Equity.
PRESUMPTION OF PAYMENT.

See Equity

RECEIVER.
Expenditure without Authority of Court.-While, as a general rule,
a receiver will not be permitted to lay out more than a small sum at
his own discretion, in the preservation or improvement of the property
under his charge, but should, in all cases where it is practicable, or the
circumstances of the case will permit, before involving the estate in
expense, apply to the court for authority for so doing, this general rule
should not be so rigidly enforced as to work wrong and injustice, where
the receiver has acted in good faith, and under such circumstances as
will enable the court to see that if previous authority had been applied
for it would have been granted: B3rown v. ffazlehurst, 54 Md.
SALE.

Assumpsit-Duty of Vendor. and Vendee when Property is sold on
Trial.-Indebitatus assumpsit lies to recover the price of an article
delivered on a written order, and in such case the writing is admissible
evidence: Gibson v. Vail, 53 Vt.
Ordinarily, when property is sold on trial, the vendee must notify
the vendor of the failure in a reasonable time, but otherwise when the
vendor agrees to examine the working of the article and learn the result
himself: Id.
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It is a species of fraud to sell an article on trial for a particular purpose, when the vendor knows, or ought to have known, from his certain
knowledge, of the facilities of the vendee in using it, that it must necessarily result in failure : Nl.
Conversations of the parties, after the written contract is made, about
the setting up and manner of using milk-pans sold on trial, are admissible : Id.
SHERIFF.

Deyitty-Power to abate Nuisance- Obstruction of Highway.-A
person appointed in writing by the sheriff to act as deputy-sheriff, possesses authority such as the sheriff himself may exercise:' Turner v.
Holtzman, 54 Md.
The sheriff or his deputy may abate a public nuisance in a public
highway: Id.
In an action for assault, against a person who had been authorized in
writing by the sheriff to act as his deputy, at a camp-meeting, and his
assistant, brought by the driver of a public* coach, it was held, 1st.
That the defendant, as deputy-sheriff, had the lawful authority to
-remove the coach of the plaintiff when he found it obstructing the
public highway, and preventing other parties, who had the right to use
the same, from travelling upon it, and to remove the plaintiff with it
if he should resist him in its removal. 2d. That he also had the right
to call to his assistance the other defendant, and such other persons as
he might deem necessary in effecting the abatement of the nuisance
thus caused and maintained by the plaintiff: Id.
SUBROGATION.

See Mortgage.

TAXATION.
Farm Property within City Limits-Taxation of for City, Purposes
When not a taking (f Property without due Process of Law.-In this
country and in England, the necessities of government, the nature of
the duties to be performed, and custom and usage, have established a
procedure in regard to the levy and collection of taxes which differs
from proceedings in courts of justice, but whidh is still "due process of
law" within the meaning of the Constitution: Kelly v. City of Pittsburgh,
S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1881.
What parts of a state, shall for local purposes, be governed by a
county, a town or a city government, and the character of the land ineluded in each, are matters of detail within the legislative discretion : Id.
When the taxes levied by a city upon land are clearly for a proper
public purpose, and are authorized by statute, the court cannot say that
,such statute deprives the owner of his property without "due process of
law" because the land is farm land. and does not reap the same benefits
as land in the heart of the 'city; Id.
Interest in Wessel employed in Foreign Commerce-The interest of a
citizen of Maryland, and resident of Baltimore, as part owner of vessels
employed in foreign commerce, registered as vessels of the United
-States in the office of the collector of customs at Baltimore, the home
.port of the vessels, an l the domicil and usual place of residence of their
acting and managing -owners, is liable for annual taxes levied on it for
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municipal purposes by the authorities uf that city; and such taxation
does not contravene the Constitution of the United States : Gunther v.
The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 55 MId.
TELEGRAPH.

Evidence- Wehich is the Original Message and which is the CopySecondary prooj-Statute of Frauds.-The message sent to a telegraph
office to be transmitted in reply to one received is the origins:, and not
the message received at the place to which it is transmitted. The
latter must be considered as a copy, and carries with it none of the qualities of primary evidence : Smith v. Easton, 54 Md.
Ordinarily, the usual course is to show the delivery of the original
message of the party sought to be charged, at the office from which
it is to be telegraphed, and then show that it was transmitted and
delivered at the place of its destination : -1d.
But even where the original is produced, its authenticity must be
established. And this either by proof of the handwriting, or by other
proof establishing its genuineness.
The destruction of all the messages sent from the office on the day
of its transmission is sufficient foundation for the admissibility of
secondary evidence. But this secondary evidence can only be admitted
upon proof that the copy offered is a correct transcript of a message
actually authorized by the party sought to be affected by its contents: Id.
While the rule which permits a letter to be admitted in evidence
against a party where there is no other proof of the handwriting, except
the fact, that in due course it had been received in reply to a letter
which had been addressed to the same party, may apply to a dispatch
in answer to a communication by letter, it is inappropriate to a dispatch
received in reply to a communication received by telegraph: .1d.
A telegraphic dispatch is a sufficient compliance with the Statute of
Frauds, in its requirement that a promise to guarantee the debt of
another should be in writing: Id.
TORT.
Promise of Marriage by farriedMon.-It is an actionable offence for
a married man to offer himself in marriage to an unmarried woman,
paying his addresses to her, and entering into a contract of marriage
with her; and a declaration counting tort-wise for fraud is held good
on demurrer: Pollock v. Sullivan, 03 Vt.
TRuSTEES.

Personal Liability for Purchases authorized by Court.-Defendants
to whom a deed in trust was made of property for the benefit of the
grantor's creditors, and who were authorized by order of a court of
equity to complete certain houses thereby conveyed to them, in course
of building when the deed was made, are responsible in their individual
capacity, for work and materials furnished by a plaintiff upon their
order, for the completion of the buildings, it appearing that there was
no agreement on his part to look to the trust estate alone for payment.
The order of court was an indemnity to the trustees for having the work
done. to be allowed them out of the trust funds: Gill v. Carmine,
55 DId.
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UsuRY.

May be taken advantage of without Plea-Renewalof NVotes.-When
one has paid usury he is entitled to have it deducted as an equitable
offset without plea or answer: Cross V.Afann, 53 Vt.
Substituting new notes and a new mortgage for old ones does not
change the debt; and usury paid on the old debt may be deducted in

ascertaining the amount due on the last mortgage when foreclosed. Id.
Distinction between this case and those cases seeking to apply usury
paid on one debt upoc another debt: id.
When overdue notes are transferred, usury paid to the original owner
may be deducted: Id.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER.

Lien for Purchase-money payable in, Istalments-Remedies upon
default in Payment-.Waiver.-If a vendor who has conveyed an absolute estate in land to his vendee and has a vendor's lien thereon for
unpaid instalments of the purchase-money, upon default in payment of
an earlier instahnent sues upon it, and obtains a personal judgment
against the vendee and causes the land to be sold under execution in
satisfaction of the judgment, he cannot, upon default in payment of a
later instalment, enforce his vendor's lien against the land. By electing to proceed at law, he will be deemed to have-waived his remedy in
equity, and the purchaser will take the land discharged of any further
liability for the debt. The rule is otherwise where the vendor, instead
of conveying in fee, has given a bond for a deed to be executed upon
payment of the purchase-money: Dickason v. Eby, 73 Mo.
WATERS AND WATERCOURSES.

Ice-pond-Tide Wafers-Dam-Prescription.-A dam built across
an arm of the sea, into which a fresh-water creek empties, to exclude
the-salt water for the purpose of creating a fresh-water pond, upon which
to cultivate and harvest ice for the market, without. direct authority of
the legislature or the delegated action of harbor commissioners, if the
case falls within their jurisdiction, is in the same sense a public nuisance as it would be to build a solid wall across a road or street: -Dyer

v. Curtis, 72 Me.

Without such authority, such a dam never acquires the right to exist
by prescription : Id.
Where, by the terms of a lease, the lessor agreed to keep up such a
dan during a certain portion of the year, in consideration of the covenants of the lease, it was held to be an illegal contract: .d.
No rule precludes either party from showing the illegality of a lease
void from public policy: Id.
A deed of a tide-mill privilege, mill-dam, wharf privilege and the
ri.ht to flow the creek and adjoining lands to high-water mark, "and
all the rights and highways connected with and belonging to said mill
privilege," gives the grantee no right to ice-cutting, nor title to the ice
formed upon a fresh-water pond raised by changing the dam so as to
exclude the salt water : Id.
WHARF.

See Negligence.

